We examine the effects of unconventional and conventional monetary policy announcements on the value of the dollar using high-frequency intraday data. Identifying monetary policy surprises from changes in interest rate futures prices in narrow windows around policy announcements, we find that surprise easings in monetary policy since the crisis began have had significant effects on the value of the dollar. We document that these changes are comparable to the effects of conventional policy changes prior to the crisis.
Introduction
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, the Federal Reserve has introduced new monetary policy measures to stabilize financial markets and mitigate the effects of the crisis on economic activity. These so-called unconventional policy tools have been necessary both because of the extraordinary nature of the financial crisis and because the federal funds policy rate was quickly dropped to its effective lower bound of near zero percent by the end of 2008. As a result, the Federal Reserve turned to large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs)-also commonly called quantitative easing-and to greater forward guidance about the future path of monetary policy to achieve its dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment.
These new policy tools come with a significant amount of uncertainty regarding their effectiveness, particularly whether the standard transmission channels of monetary policy through financial asset markets work as well as they did in the past. An important channel through which changes in monetary policy affect the economy is the value of the currency. There is much empirical evidence, for instance, documenting that the dollar typically depreciated following declines in the federal funds rate in the pre-crisis period (see, for instance, Clarida and Galì 1994; Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996; Faust and Rogers, 2003; Scholl and Uhlig, 2008; and Bouakez and Normandin, 2010) .
In this paper, we examine how the U.S. dollar has reacted to changes in unconventional monetary policy since the federal funds rate reached its zero lower bound in December 2008 and how this effect compares to those following changes in conventional monetary policy in the preceding period. To do so, we use high-frequency, intraday data to study the dollar's movements against the currencies of major U.S. trading partners in time intervals immediately following monetary policy announcements by the Federal Reserve. The use of intraday data enables us to better isolate the response of the dollar to monetary announcements from other possible determinants. In addition, to control for the likelihood that market participants anticipate policy changes, we follow Wright (2011) and construct surprise changes in monetary policy using changes in long-term Treasury rate futures around the time of policy announcements. We employ a similar methodology for the pre-crisis period when the federal funds rate was above the zero lower bound: we use changes in federal funds rate futures around Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements about the federal funds rate target to measure conventional policy surprises. 1 We document that the U.S. dollar depreciated significantly following both conventional and unconventional monetary policy surprises. Looking first at the effects of unconventional monetary policy since the end of 2008, we find that a one standard deviation surprise easing in unconventional policy leads to a roughly 40 basis point (bp) decline in the value of the dollar within 60 minutes. In turn, we find that in the conventional policy period the dollar depreciated in response to federal funds rate easing surprises, with a one standard deviation surprise easing leading to about a 6 bp decline in the value of the dollar in the hour after announcements.
Clearly, our surprise changes in conventional and unconventional monetary policy are not directly comparable since the former captures unanticipated changes in a very short-term interest rate, while the latter captures unanticipated changes in long-term interest rates. To enable comparison of unconventional and conventional monetary policy effects, we analyze the comovements in federal funds and long-term rates during the period when the funds rate was above its lower bound. This yields an adjustment parameter that we use to rescale the measure of unconventional policy surprises into equivalent fund rate surprises. The resulting adjusted coefficients indicate that a one standard deviation surprise unconventional policy easing leads to a 5 to 6 bp depreciation in the dollar, magnitudes that are comparable to those for federal funds rate surprises in the pre-crisis period. This suggests that monetary policy has the same bang-perunit of surprise as previously and that the exchange channel of monetary policy is still working as effectively as in the past.
Our paper adds to a growing and active literature on the effects of unconventional monetary policy. Starting with Gagnon et al. (2011) Glick and Leduc (2012) , Hamilton and Wu (2012) , and Li and Wei (2012) ). By emphasizing the effects on the U.S. exchange rate, our work is closest to that of Neely (2010) , who looks at the impact of announcements of large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve between November 2008 and November 2009. Our focus is different, as we contrast the effect of surprise changes in unconventional policy on the exchange rate to those from changes in the federal funds rate. In addition, our work differs in that it controls for market expectations of possible changes in monetary policy, which is important to precisely identify the surprise component of policy announcements. Abstracting from anticipation effects may otherwise lead to incorrect inference, as forward-looking market participants may have already responded to the policy change by the time it is announced. We also have the benefit of working with a longer sample that includes policy announcements during the first, second, and third rounds of large-scale asset purchases between 2008 and 2012.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data and measures of monetary surprises. Section 3 presents the benchmark empirical results for the effects of unconventional and conventional monetary policy on the value of the dollar. Robustness exercises are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Identification of Monetary Policy Events and Surprises

Identifying monetary policy surprises
We examine the effects of monetary policy surprises on the value of the U.S. dollar during the period when monetary policy was conventionally conducted via changes in the federal funds rate target and the more recent period when policymakers relied on other unconventional policy tools, such as large-scale asset purchases and communications about future policy actions.
Our sample period for conventional monetary policy actions extends from February 1994, when the FOMC began issuing a press release after every meeting and every change in policy, until The extent to which an announcement affects the currency when it is released to the public largely depends on whether or not market participants expect the announcement. If market participants anticipate the content of the news, then no additional information is revealed at the time of the announcement and the value of the dollar should not move as a result. Therefore, controlling for market participants' expectations is crucial for our analysis. To identify surprise changes in monetary policy, we use changes in interest rate futures in a tight time interval around monetary policy news.
For the conventional policy period, given that monetary policy is conducted via changes in the target for the federal funds rate, we follow the approach proposed in Kuttner (2001) other studies on the effects of large-scale asset purchases. For instance, the five announcements associated with the first round of large-scale asset purchases (LSAP1) between November 25, 2008, and March 18, 2009 , correspond to those used by Gagnon et al. (2011) and Neely (2010) .
Similarly, the five announcements for the second round of asset purchases (LSAP2) from August 10 to November 3, 2010, are similar to those used by Wright (2011) , Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) , and Glick and Leduc (2012) . In addition, our analysis encompasses announcements associated with the third round of asset purchases (LSAP3) initiated in September 2012.
Intraday exchange rate movements
For our analysis, we use intraday data on currency futures prices from Tickdata for the days in our announcement sample. The data set contains minute-by-minute tick prices on foreign exchange contracts involving the U.S. dollar with several currencies, including the euro, yen, pound, and Canadian dollar. One advantage of using intraday data that is particularly relevant for monetary policy announcements is that it enables us to better isolate their effects. For instance, many studies of large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve since 2008 have relied on daily data to assess the effect of unconventional monetary policy on the price of financial assets (see, for instance, Gagnon et al. (2011) ). This approach assumes that the market effects from a monetary announcement will dominate effects from any other information released that day. However, this 9 These data are based on contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. 10 The euro, yen, pound, and Canadian dollar accounted for 39, 15, 12, and 7 percent of spot transactions, respectively.
assumption may be particularly troublesome for asset prices such as exchange rates, which react naturally to news from around the world. Hence, it is more difficult to precisely uncover potential links between monetary policy announcements and movements in currency values using daily data, as the effects of other news events on the U.S. dollar are likely to confound those from monetary policy.
Consequently, we look at movements in the value of the U.S. dollar against foreign currencies in relatively narrow time intervals. Consistent with our identification of the monetary policy surprises, we use response windows around monetary policy announcements of 30 minutes (10 minutes before, until 20 minutes after) and 70 minutes (10 minutes before, until 60 minutes after). Using tight time intervals helps us isolate the effects of the monetary announcements from other possible determinants of currency values, assuming these announcements rapidly influence the views of market participants and are quickly reflected in the value of the dollar. For comparison, we also report results extending the response surprise windows to 1440 minutes, i.e., one day, after announcements.
Results
Changes in value of the dollar during LSAP rounds
We begin our analysis by reporting the raw, i.e., actual, changes in the value of the dollar during the three rounds of LSAPs. ineffective, since the markets may have anticipated these announcements and incorporated them into asset prices. This motivates the need to control for the extent to which the announcements were surprises to the market.
For comparison, the table also shows total changes in the interday value of the dollar against major currencies, also known as the "narrow nominal index," as measured over the 24-hour period from the end of floor trading on the day prior to each announcement (usually 2:30pm EST) and the end of floor trading on the announcement day. Note that the interday changes during LSAP1 are comparable to the intraday changes measured over the event window periods.
In the case of LSAP2, however, the narrow dollar actually appreciated. This suggests that narrow response windows are desirable to control for other events as much as possible when ascertaining the effects of monetary policy on the exchange rate.
Effects of unconventional monetary policy
We estimate the effects of surprise monetary policy announcements on the value of the dollar using the following specification: Table 3 reports coefficients from regressions of the value of the dollar on our measure of unconventional policy surprises, using response windows of lengths ranging from 10 minutes before the announcement to w = 20, 60, 1440 minutes (i.e., one day) after. Constants are included in the regressions, though they generally are insignificantly different from zero.
The analysis finds that the dollar depreciates against all currencies in response to these surprises, with a one standard deviation surprise leading to a 36 bp decline in the trade-weighted value of the dollar within 20 minutes. 13 This effect appears to persist over time, with a 58 bp depreciation after one day, though the role of other possible determinants of exchange rates may 13 In terms of basis points, an unconventional monetary policy surprise of one percentage point (100 bp) causes a 3.0 percent decline in the value of the dollar within 20 minutes. Converting this result into the effects of a standardized surprise by dividing it by the standard deviation of unconventional monetary surprises over the sample period, 12.1 bp, gives the result we report in Table 3 .
not be ruled out with this longer response window. The effects vary across individual currencies as well as across time, with the effects lowest for the Canadian dollar and highest for the euro. In the latter case, for example, a one standard deviation unconventional policy surprise leads to a 44 bp increase after 20 minutes and a 71 bp increase after one day.
The scatter plots in Figure 2 support the negative slope coefficient results in Table 3 
Effects of conventional monetary surprises
To assess the magnitude of the exchange rate effects of unconventional policy surprises, it is useful to compare them with the effects of conventional monetary policy during the period when the federal funds target rate was the main policy tool, before the target rate reached the lower bound. Table 4 reports the actual movements in the dollar following FOMC announcements during the pre-crisis period of February 1994 to October 2008, grouped by the direction and magnitude of the change in the federal funds rate. Observe that the dollar generally appreciated in response to rate hikes, more so with increases greater than 25 bp. Correspondingly, the dollar generally depreciated in response to rate cuts of greater than 25 bp. The response of the dollar to rate cuts of 25 bp is an exception to the pattern with the dollar appreciating on average.
Actual rate changes do not control for the extent to which markets anticipated the effects of monetary policy announcements. Table 5 reports the dollar response coefficients to surprise changes in the federal funds rate, analogous to the analysis in Table 3 . As expected, the dollar depreciated in response to federal funds easing surprises, with a one standard deviation surprise easing in the federal funds rate leading to a change in the trade-weighted dollar of about a 6 bps after 20 minutes and 10 bps after a day.14 It should be noted that the significance of the coefficients for some currencies is somewhat lower than in the case of the unconventional policy surprises. Moreover, the R2 of all of these regressions is fairly low, indicating that other factors played a large role in exchange rate movements.
Comparison of dollar effects from unconventional and conventional policy surprises
Because the surprise changes in our unconventional policy measure involve changes in long-term interest rates, their effect on the U.S. exchange rate is not directly comparable to those following surprises changes in the federal funds rate, an overnight interest rate. To enable comparison of unconventional and conventional monetary policy effects, we convert our unconventional policy surprises into equivalent federal funds rate surprises. To do so, we first extend our measure of unconventional policy surprises back to 1994 and examine how it typically reacted following a surprise change in the federal funds rate during the period when the funds rate was above its lower bound. Clearly, for this period, our measure of unconventional policy does not proxy for changes in monetary policy. However, it will be affected by changes in 14 In terms of basis points, a conventional monetary policy surprise of one percentage point (100 basis points) causes a 0.67 percent decline in the value of the dollar within 20 minutes. Converting this result into the effects of a standardized surprise by dividing it by the standard deviation of conventional monetary surprises over the period, 9.2 basis points, gives the result we report in Table 5. monetary policy, as measured by unanticipated changes in federal funds rate futures. We examine this relationship by regressing our measure of unconventional policy surprises on the measure of conventional policy surprises over the period February 1994 to October 2008.
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The estimated slope coefficient, which we define by the parameter γ , captures the average relationship between unconventional policy surprises and conventional policy surprises. We then use this parameter to rescale the unconventional policy measure of long-term rate surprises during the zero lower bound period into equivalent fund rate surprises. This conversion enables us to report the relative responses of the dollar to conventional and unconventional policy surprises in comparable terms.
In our benchmark case, shown in the top panel of Table 3 by this parameter renders them into terms comparable to federal funds rate surprises. For example, the estimated coefficient for the response of the trade-weighted dollar to a one standard deviation surprise easing in unconventional policy after 20 minutes, -36.39, is equivalent to an adjusted dollar response of -5.3 bp (= -36.29*0.146) to a one standard deviation surprise easing in the federal funds rate. We consider alternative estimates of the adjustment parameter γ in Section 4. Table 7 reports the results of adjusting the estimated coefficients from Table 3 for unconventional policy surprises, together with the estimated coefficients from Table 5 for the conventional policy surprises, and the ratio of the two numbers. It shows that an unconventional policy surprise easing leads to a 5.3 bp (5.8 bp) depreciation in the trade-weighted dollar after 20 (60) minutes and 8.5 bp after a day. These magnitudes are comparable to those for federal fund rate surprises, with the ratios of the effects of unconventional to conventional policy being roughly 0.9 across response windows. This suggests that unconventional monetary policy has the same "bang" per unit of surprise as the federal funds rate previously had and that the exchange channel of monetary policy is still working effectively.
Robustness Analysis
We assess the robustness of our results to factors such as the size of the window over which the monetary surprises are calculated, the composition of surprise events, and the magnitude of the adjustment parameter. Table 8 reports the results of several exercises for the response of the trade-weighted dollar.
Wider surprise windows
We first consider the implications of a wider window over which both the conventional and unconventional policy surprises are calculated, going from 10 minutes before announcements until 60 (rather than 20) minutes after. As shown in panel B, we find that the exchange rate response-a 6 bp change in the dollar within 60 minutes following a standardized surprise-is virtually the same as with the benchmark narrow window.
Excluding LSAP1 events
Figure 2 suggests that much of the power of the negative relation between unconventional policy surprises and the dollar may come from the LSAP1 episodes, which appeared to surprise markets the most. As shown in panel C of Table 8, excluding LSAP1 events from the sample indeed implies an estimated dollar response in the hour after unconventional policy announcements-a 3 to 4 bp change in the dollar following a surprise-that is less than the 6 bp decline following both unconventional and conventional surprises in the benchmark. 17 It should also be noted that there is virtually no response to unconventional policy surprises a day later, though the effects over the longer response window may be confounded by the effects of other shocks affecting exchange rates. 
Alternative adjustment parameter
The adjustment parameter γ is key to comparing the effects of unconventional and conventional monetary policy. We next consider alternative estimates of the adjustment parameter used to rescale the effects from unconventional policy into comparable conventional policy effects. Table 6 Table 6 reports the results of excluding these outliers from the sample used to estimate the adjustment parameter. Observe that the adjustment parameter estimate, 0.375, is more than double the benchmark estimate and is significant at the 5 percent level.
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The differential effects of intermeeting announcements have been noted in other studies. Other intermeetings we exclude are October 15, 1998, following the Russian ruble devaluation and near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management for which we were unable to construct our unconventional policy measure because of the closure of the Treasuries markets at the time of the announcement (at 3:15pm); and March 11, 2008, which is omitted from the D'Amico and Farka (2011) data set we use. Our analysis does include more recent unscheduled meetings on January 22 and October 8, 2008. Both of these events occurred before the federal funds rate reached its lower bound and are included in our conventional rate period that ends with October 2008. We treat all Bernanke speeches as scheduled since market analysts had advance notice of these events. 20 A regression (not reported) which includes intermeeting observations with an intercept and interactive slope dummy indicates there is a statistically significant shift in the intercept term but no change in the slope associated with the outliers.
and October 15, 2008. 21 22 They find that Treasury rates responded particularly slowly to the announcements on these days. They suggest several reasons why intermeeting moves might be important in explaining the market's weak response: intermeeting target rate easing surprises tend to occur in relatively uncertain environments; tend to be larger; and may have a larger "signaling" component than other announcements about economic weakness, dampening bond demand, and the easing of long-term rates, or alternatively may take a longer time to be digested and processed by markets. Consequently the association of conventional and unconventional policy surprises may have been affected. Table 8 report the effects of using our alternative estimates of γ on the adjusted dollar response to unconventional policy surprises. Estimation from ending the sample in November 2007, before the establishment of special facilities began, implies responses in the trade-weighted dollar on the order of 10 to 11 bps within the first hour in response to a one standard deviation surprise easing. These magnitudes are larger than the estimated 5 to 6 bp response to conventional policy easing surprises over the same interval. Thus in this case the effects of unconventional policy surprises exceed those of conventional ones by roughly 60 percent across all of the response windows. Still larger are the adjusted effects when we omit the intermeetings from the sample, reported in panel E. In this case the dollar rises by roughly 14 to 15 bps within the hour and 22 bps after a day. Panel E of the table also reports the effects of reestimating the conventional policy effects on the dollar with the intermeetings excluded. Observe 21 Gurkaynak et al. (2005) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) also exclude September 17, 2001, on the grounds that asset market responses at that time reflect not just the effects of the FOMC announcement but also the fact that it was the first day that the federal funds rate market was open after the September 11 terrorist attack. 22 The October 15, 1998, event followed the Russian ruble devaluation and the near collapse of Long-Term Capital that these effects are also higher compared with the benchmark. 23 We find that the tradeweighted dollar depreciates in this case by 12, 17, and 10 bps compared to 6, 6, and 10 bps in the benchmark after 20, 60, and 1440 minutes, respectively. Thus dropping the intermeeting observations raises the impact of both types of policy surprise on the dollar, with the relative magnitude of their effects varying over the response window. The ratio of unconventional effects to conventional effects is 1.15 after 20 minutes and 0.89 after 60 minutes.
Panels D and E of
Conclusion
Using intraday data, we examine the effects of unconventional monetary policy on the U.S. dollar. Our results suggest that the exchange rate effect of the new policy has been as effective as it was when the Federal Reserve could rely on changes in the federal funds rate to conduct monetary policy. In particular, we find that monetary policy now has much the same bang per surprise on the value of the dollar as previously: roughly 6 bp change per unit surprise.
That said, although unconventional monetary policy remains effective at moving the value of the dollar, it remains more difficult to assess the overall impact on U.S. net exports. For instance, it is quite possible that the response of U.S. net exports to dollar depreciation may have been less than in the past because of greater uncertainty surrounding economic recoveries around the world, most particularly in Europe, which is still battling its debt crisis. We leave this important issue to future research. 23 Regressions for the dollar response to conventional policy surprises to individual currencies without the outliers are available upon request. (Feb. 1994 -Nov. 2007 Note: *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Exchange rate changes are in basis point units and surprises are in standardized units, so the figures in the table can be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the magnitude of the policy surprise on the exchange rate in basis points. A negative coefficient indicates dollar depreciation. 
